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A book on Buddhist phenomenology can be 
either phenomenalist or phenomenological. The 
first option derives from the fundamental 
philosophical assumption that the only things we 
deal with are the phenomena, the appearances 
organized into an external and internal world by 
certain transcendental-aesthetic and logical 
schemata, as in the critical philosophy of Kant. 
The second option leaves open the door for the 
noumena to enter and, after stripping them of all 
existential contingency, calls them by their 
proper name: self-manifesting essences (sich-
selbst-zeigende-Soseinheiten). This is the way 
followed by Husserl and the transcendental 
phenomenology. 
In the former case, we have a world of ever-
changing appearances with no self-being 
(svabhava) behind them (or at least with no 
svabhava given to our cognitive powers), while 
in the latter case, we dispense with the world of 
changing phenomena and reach for the absolutely 
apodictic realm of the self-manifesting and self-
subsisting eide governed by the rules of the 
Transcendental Subjectivity. The self-evident 
phenomena - divorced from all sense data and 
seen in the light of the a priori regularities of the 
Transcendental Subject - form the many-layered 
horizontal ontologies within the framework of the 
transcendental-phenomenological doctrine of 
constitution. This is the real philosophical pathos 
of the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl: 
Down with the mischievous senses, back to the 
things themselves. 
Yogacara philosophy, argues Dan Lusthaus, is 
the Buddhist phenomenology (p. 11). This true 
statement is paradoxically based on two false 
premises: (1) the naturalist interpretation of 
Husserlian phenomenology, and (2) the 
contention that Yogacara philosophy is not a 
form of ontological idealism. What is common to 
both is seen rather in the idea that “there is no 
thought, feeling, idea, memory, or knowledge of 
any kind that does not come to us through our 
senses” (p. 1). Husserl would reply to this with 
the famous “praeter intellectum” of Leibnitz, 
while Asanga and Vasubandhu, the two biggest 
authorities in Yogacara, would totally disagree: 
“Just on the contrary, there is nothing in the 
senses that could be interpreted as different from 
the intellect, because the senses are but pure 
intellect, citta-matra.” 
Before presenting evidence of the author’s false 
attitude to both Husserl and Yogacara, a few 
introductory words should be said about the 
structure and the purport of the book as a whole. 
The subtitle proclaims it to be a philosophical 
investigation into the Yogacara Buddhism and 
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the Hsuan-tsang’s Chinese commentary on 
Trimsika of Vasubandhu, known as Ch’eng Wei-
Shin Lun. The book consists of a Preface, Five 
parts, Appendices, Bibliography, and an Index.  
Part One, Buddhism and Phenomenology, 
outlines the basic Yogacara tenets, its doctrinal 
alternatives, and the phenomenology of Husserl 
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in two fundamental 
aspects – the nature of the sensational material 
(hyle) and the intentional arc with its noematic 
and noetic poles.  Part Two, The Four Basic 
Buddhist Models in India, describes the four 
paradigms along which the Buddhist schools and 
doctrines have been evolving through the ages: 
The psychological model of exploring the 
world of our experience from the point of 
view of the dharmas (elemental experience 
data, kind of experiential atoms) and the five 
aggregates (skandha) comprising them. 
The causal model of the co-dependent 
origination (pratitya-samutpada). 
The cosmological model of the three 
fundamental world-axes (tridhatu), 
including the world of desire (kama-dhatu), 
the material world of rupa-dhatu, and the 
immaterial world of arupa-dhatu. 
The soteriological model of (a) normative 
life (sila), (b) vita contemplativa (samadhi), 
and (c) the perfection of wisdom (prajna) as 
a skillful means (upaya) for getting the 
desired fruit of the ultimate liberation 
(nirupadhisesa-nirvana). 
An intermittent chapter has been added to 
“illustrate in part how the four models … were 
deployed by Buddhism” (p. 123), but in fact, 
Chapter Seven deals quite logically with the two 
ways of becoming liberated that were not 
covered by the progress of the cognitive Yoga as 
depicted in the four preceding chapters. These are 
the two kinds of meditation representative of the 
so-called transcognitive (asamprajnata) 
soteriology, namely, the meditation, or better, 
direct intervention into the world of the 
subconscious (asamjni-samapatti), and the 
meditation on the very notion of cessation 
(nirodha-samapatti). Both of them are listed on 
page 544 of the book as subliminal tendencies 
not related to consciousness (cittaviprayukta-
samskara-dharma). 
Chapter Eight presents a summary of the four 
models and a suggestion that, above all, prajna is 
a “practical knowledge”, on the simple ground 
that the “prefix pra- (cognate to pro- in English)” 
is indicating ‘moving towards’ (p. 164). The 
Sanskrit prefix pra- can be traced to the Latin 
prae- and the Slavic pra- with the meaning of 
something preceding, archaic, fundamental.  
Prajna, translated as wisdom, is what precedes 
the knowledge; it is the fundament and the source 
of knowledge. This might not be so clear to those 
who study the Hindu intellectual traditions, but 
for a Buddhologist, this comprehension of prajna 
is a must – considering its status as 
cittasamprayukta-samskara-dharma in all 
Abhidharma lists, and its role of cognitive 
indriya (power) in the Sarvastivada systematics 
of the 24 indriyas. 
Part Three deals with traditional topics, like 
karma and meditation, in their relation to the 
epistemology, restoring to some extent the 
meaning of prajna as transcendental perfection. 
Part Four contains the original Sanskrit text of 
Vasubandhu’s Trimsika and its two Chinese 
translations by Paramartha and Hsuan-tsang. In 
this regard, every version is separately translated 
into English, annotated, and cross-analyzed. 
Part Five, The Ch’eng Wei-Shin Lun and the 
Problem of Psychosophical Closure: Yogacara in 
China, though not philosophical but rather 
psychosophical - is the investigation promised by 
the subtitle, followed by the very handy One 
Hundred and the Seventy-Five Abhidharma lists, 
duly translated and compared. 
Now let us proceed with the textual criticism 
providing concrete examples of Dan Lusthaus’ 
misinterpretation of  Husserlian phenomenology 
and Vijnanavada. The deviation starts with his 
outlining of the methodological principles along 
which the comparative study of Yogacara and 
phenomenology will be performed. On the very 
first page, we read "We are constituted by how 
we respond to and interpret our sensations." The 
phenomenology of both Husserl and Yogacara 
takes the opposite stand; they believe that the 
way we respond to, and interpret, the sensations 
is predetermined by our transcendental 
constitution.  It is important to note that the 
phenomenological constitution has nothing to do 
with our naturalistically attained and interpreted 
sensations. On the contrary, according to 
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Yogacara, even the simplest definite sensation 
implies an act of inference, and, as demonstrated 
by Dignaga, can be defined as a kind of 
affirmative syllogism (anuvyavasaya).  The 
intentionality is an act of imparting meaning to 
the sense data; hence our preformatted 
constitutional schemata (kalpana in the language 
of Yogacara) are molding the material provided 
by the senses. 
According to Yogacara our mental 
experience is changing, alterating 
(parinama, pravrtti) every moment. In this 
fluctuating stream (vijnana-santana) we 
tend to posit two constants ... Atman ... and 
dharmas (affective, thetic, and ‘objective’ 
circumstances) ... (ibid.) 
Let us remember that the Atman and the dharmas 
have been defined as constants. Constant means 
unchangeable, stable, ergo, permanent. Is Dr. 
Lusthaus trying to convince us that dharmas are 
unchangeable, stable, and permanent constituents 
of our mental flux? Yes, dharmas have been 
determined unequivocally as constants. Is Dr. 
Lusthaus aware of the existence of ksanika-vada 
(theory that everything is momentary)? Evidently 
he is. Why then does Dan Lusthaus define the 
dharmas as constant elements of our ever-
changing experience? This is curious because he 
underlines the idea that both Atman and dharmas 
are “constructions fabricated (parikalpita) 
through our attempt to suppress the anxieties and 
fears which [notions of] change, impermanence, 
uncertainty, instability and death arouse in us 
[and then forgetting all this] we invest our 
invented constants with ultimate sanctity and 
significance.” 
So, it turns out that both Atman and dharmas are 
parikalpita, imagined constructions of ours. Not 
paratantra and certainly not parinispanna (the 
other two natures accepted by Vasubandhu in his 
Trisvabhava-nirdesa). Turning to Vasubandhu, 
we find out that parikalpita is a characteristic of 
all imagined phenomena that have no real 
referent behind them, like the parikalpita 
elephant of the mayavadin (illusionist) which 
disappears as soon as the mayavadin withdraws 
his mantra. Atman and dharmas, according to 
Dan Lusthaus, are illusions, mirages, magically 
created noematic visions in our ever-changing 
noetic flux of our never-ending desires. 
Vasubandhu, however, defines the dharmas as 
samvrttisat (empirical) when they allow further 
analysis, and as paramarthasat (transcendental 
truths) when no further analysis is possible. In 
the region of transcendental phenomenology, 
there is no time; permanent and impermanent are 
highly irrelevant characteristics when applied to 
tathata or bhutarthatva nature of all dharmas, 
i.e., when we take dharmas as ultimate objects of 
samadhi-prajna, the Indian equivalent of 
phenomenological Wesenschau. On the first page 
of his psychosophical study, Lusthaus defines 
Atman and dharmas as parikalpita phenomena, 
and thus makes the application of any reasonable, 
historically valid phenomenological approach to 
the object of his study – the Yogacara 
epistemology – impossible. 
There is another questionable definition on this 
starting page, namely that dharmas are “affective, 
thetic, and ‘objective’ circumstances.” 
Affective - if we look at the rupa-skandha (group 
of matter), we will not find a dharma capable of 
being predicated as “affective.” How could earth, 
water, fire, and air be affective circumstances?  
Affective is a qualification that is applicapble 
only – and partly – to vedana-skandha and to 
some dharmas from the range of samskara-
skandha. In no case are all dharmas affective. So 
the first element in this starting definition of the 
dharma is defective as it is too specific 
(asadharana) and cannot be used as a valid 
dharma-visesana (qualifier). 
Thetic - the word implies that all dharmas be 
posited, and not pre-found as “existing” or, to use 
the proper word, as “prajnaptically” (mentally) or 
“vyavaharically” (empirically) subsisting, i.e., 
not as ultimate phenomena accessible by this or 
that form of Buddhist samapatti (valid direct 
attainment of the cognitive content being an 
object for meditation). Every thetic act of 
consciousness requires a thetic actor. And since 
there is no Atman to take the role of the 
transcendental subject (TS), we have to look for 
the actor among the dharmas themselves. This 
will lead us to the conclusion that there are two 
types of dharmas - positing dharmas, playing the 
role of the absent TS, and posited dharmas. So, 
we are led once again to conclude that the 
qualification “thetic” is also too specific as it 
does not cover all types of dharmas, or, if it does, 
then it requires something other than the 
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dharmas, namely, the TS which could serve as 
the dharmin (bearer) of all posited dharmas. 
‘Objective’ - the single quotes imply that the 
dharmas are in fact not objective; hence they are 
subjective, because the third is not given. But 
how can they be subjective if there is no subject 
in Buddhism? Subjective means appending to 
some subject or produced by some subject. We 
have dismissed the Atman as an illusory mental 
construction (parikalpita). What is then our 
quasi-subjectivity? So, the third visesana is 
invalid in its philosophical implications. Dharmas 
are either objective without quotes, or subjective. 
They cannot be subjective by default. What now 
remains is to define them without any quotes as 
objective. Here, I should like to add, objective 
does not necessarily mean existential, 
substantially existing. By doubting the possibility 
of acquiring objective knowledge about the 
objective dharmas, Dan Lusthaus is cutting off 
the last chance of producing a sustainable 
phenomenological interpretation of Yogacara 
idealism. 
The last element in Lusthaus’ definition throws 
the baby out with the bath water, because the 
dharmas are by no way "circumstances." The 
irony of the author's interpretive methodology is 
that by circumstances, Dan Lusthaus understands 
nothing else but the object of cognition, the 
grasped as such (grahya, visaya, gocara). The 
three terms in the brackets are listed as synonyms 
which does not make much sense because 
something can be visaya (object) without being 
grahya (grasped, as, for instance, is the case with 
the grasping, the noetic acts as such and the 
graspers taken as objective targets, alambana, of 
meditation) while gocara is the intentional 
horizon of all indriya-specific objects rather than 
the objects themselves; gocara, so to say, is the 
pasture with the grass for the indriyas (sense 
organs), not the grass itself. 
How, based on such misconceived ideas about 
the nature of Buddhist epistemology, will the 
author manage to apply the phenomenological 
method of Husserl to Yogacara? Lusthaus 
understands the phenomenology as the projection 
of our misconceived ideas onto the “objective 
reality.” Yet, there is an attempt to reach for our 
true identity obscured by theories “by which we 
give value and identity to ourselves through the 
values and identities we project on the objects.” 
This is the case in the eidetic phenomenology 
too, but Husserl is not found saying, “we grasp 
physical objects precisely because of the theories 
we have of them and ourselves” (ibid.). The 
‘etiology’ of our cognitive phenomena is a 
genetic-phenomenological question. For quite a 
long period, Husserl disregarded the genetic 
phenomenology as irrelevant to the 
phenomenological method. Its main goal was to 
bracket all existential characteristics of the 
objects posited in our natural Einstellung for the 
sake of making phenomena self-appear. Causality 
pertains to the realm of Dasein, hence it is 
subject to phenomenological reduction. If we 
look at, say, Dharmakirti, we will find that 
causality is the proper energy of the self-
revealing phenomena called svalaksana.  In fact, 
causality in Buddhist logic is the svalaksana of 
the Ultimate Reality.  The ultimate phenomena in 
the case of Buddhist transcendental logic are the 
sources of all causal energy of our prapancita 
(phenomenal) world. For Husserl, and especially 
for Max Scheler, who was far more radical in 
developing the metaphysical implications of the 
phenomenological method, the ultimate and pure 
phenomena are lacking causal energy, they are 
powerless (and this should not be interpreted in 
the sense that the phenomenology is 
methodologically powerless). 
After repeating what has already been said about 
the “theoretical projectedness” of our Atman and 
dharmas (interpreted as external projections, or 
exteriorizations of our theories), and which has 
already been critiqued, the author continues with 
a seemingly trivial statement that “according to 
Buddhism what we fundamentally lack is a ‘self’, 
and our frantic search and grasping for ‘things’ is 
at once a sign of our sense of this lack ..." (p. 2). 
According to Buddha, those who hold the non-
existence of the Self are called nihilists 
(ucchedavadins) and those who maintain the 
eternality (sasvata) of the Self are called 
eternalists (sasvatavadins). What any Buddhist 
would follow is the Middle Way between 
eternalism and nihilism. Consequently, what this 
implies is that Buddhism does not approve of the 
theories that claim that there is fundamentally no 
Self at any level of reality. While such uncritical 
claims are popular with the general Buddhist 
public, it is not very clear what their raison d'etre 
is in such a serious academic work. The only 
reason, as it seems, is to stress that while 
Buddhism is exempt from the ’mcdonaldizing’ 
quest for things, “religions such as Hinduism 
may formalize and valorize this frantic pursuit” 
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(p. 2). This is a strikingly non-academic and 
politically incorrect declaration in such an 
academic book! What about ‘tarati sokam 
atmavid’ (the knower of the Self puts an end to 
the sorrow)? Will it also be interpreted as know 
thyself in order to get rich? 
Here comes the revealed secret of the semantic 
potential of the word ‘projection’. “The world 
that the unenlightened experience is the 
projection (pratibimba) of their own desires and 
anxieties (Pali, asava, Skt., asrava)” (ibid.). I 
have perused several dictionaries in search of a 
possible interpretation of pratibimba as 
projection. The Monier-Williams Sanskrit-
English dictionary explains the word as 
reflection, resemblance, or shadow of the real 
world, counterform, as the etymology of the 
word suggests, an image that is depending in its 
visual being on something else. Nyaya-kosa, the 
most authoritative Sanskrit dictionary of 
philosophical terms, explans on page 534: 
 
pratibimbanam - 1 anukaraNam | 
ythA dRSTAntas tu sadharmasya 




bhAvaH ityadau | 
 
Pratibimbana here is defined as imitation, or 
resemblance of an image to a thing possessing 
the same properties (dharma). Or, as the second 
definition runs, it is an experience of the 
isomorphic shadow cast by the original, and an 
example of such a relation of bimba and 
pratibimba (original and reflection), according to 
the Vedantic doctrine of illusionism, is the 
relation between Isvara and the individual soul. 
Again we have the original and dependent image. 
In our case, the phenomenal world which we 
experience as real is, in fact, a reflected image of 
the immanent and transcendental-cognitive 
reality. The nature of the phenomenal world, 
according to this definition, is paratantric, 
dependent. This is what Dr. Lusthaus states on 
the second page of his book. However, on the 
first page he determines the nature of Atman and 
dharmas, making up the content of the 
phenomenal world, as illusionary fabrications 
(parikalpita). 
According to Vasubandhu, there are three 
different natures (trisvabhava) of reality – 
imagined (parikalpita), ontologically dependent 
(paratantra), and metaphysically ripe 
(parinispanna). On two consecutive pages, 
Lusthaus has managed to define one and the 
same object – the phenomenal reality – with the 
help of two excluding characteristics; first, as 
imagined, and, second, as ontologically 
dependent. This suggests that the ideas he has 
about the nature of the main Yogacara 
philosophical tenets are not much parinispanna 
Knowing Dan Lusthaus to be one of the finest 
Yogacara scholars, it was surprising to discover 
on page 3 of his book the following claim: 
That realization [namely, that no 
permanent, immutable self has ever or 
will ever exist], when experienced at 
the root of all one's cognitive activities 
and abilities (mula-vijnana), is 
liberation; the after-effect of this 
realization is nirvana... 
This sounds very much like ideological Atiyoga 
slogan rather than as a documented Yogacara 
tenet. One can liberate oneself from the idea of 
the Self on a purely empirical-psychology level – 
there are many examples of ideologically 
imposed depersonalizations of Buddhists without 
proceeding to immediate liberation of that 
“person.” What then is the difference between 
realizing anatma on a psychology-
penomenological level and realizing it on the 
level of mula-vijnana (root consciousness)? 
What we have from the discourses of Buddha is 
anatma-vada on a descriptive-psychological 
level, which by no means presupposes or requires 
the non-existence of the Self as a lemma. In three 
suttas, the most important of which is the Anatta-
lakkhana-sutta, Buddha explicitly says what 
Atma is not – rupa is not Atma, vedana is not 
Atma, etc., because, IF THEY WERE, they 
would have been permanent, painless, and 
unchanging, or, as the Anuradha-sutta says: 
 
- Yam pan aniccam dukkham viparinama-
dhammam kallannu tam samanupassitum 
‘etam mama eso'ham asmi, eso me atta’ iti? 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 5, Edition 1 April 2005  Page 6 of 10 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org.  
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This 
document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, 
electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the publishers. 
- No hetam, bhante.1 
It is my belief that the Yogacarins developed this 
latent transcendental idealism of Buddha into a 
full-fledged philosophical system, with the 
Atman as the highest transcendental reality. And 
it is precisely on the level of mula-vijnana that 
one comes to the realization of the fact that one is 
Buddha, and that Buddha is one’s true 
Transcendental Self; while anatta applies to the 
level of descriptive phenomenology and performs 
the functions of apophatic advancement towards 
the realization of the Ultimate Truth. 
What follows further on the same page is a 
psycho-analytic interpretation of our distressed 
projection and reprojection activity. We project 
our dissatisfactions and illusions as external 
reality (samsara). Phenomenology is not a help-
yourself philosophy of the mentally retarded, 
reality dissatisfied, or sexually concerned 
individuals. It is about the immanent life of the 
mentally absolutely sound psyche, reaching from 
there out to the stage of the pure transcendental 
phenomena and, further, to the constitutive 
domain of the Transcendental Subjectivity. So 
far, with his declared denial of the existence of 
TS in Yogacara, Lusthaus makes impossible the 
realization of the basic intention of his book, 
which is to demonstrate that Yogacara is the 
Buddhist phenomenology. By ‘Buddhist 
phenomenology’ he understands the investigation 
of the dharmas. And the dharmas have been 
defined as changing parikalpita phenomena, i.e., 
as empirical phenomena subject to the laws of the 
existential contingency. This provides pause for 
thought regarding the documented reasons for 
declarations of the following: “The affinities 
between Buddhist phenomenologists and 
Western phenomenologists are at times striking.” 
The phenomenology of Husserl has nothing to do 
with the existentially relative phenomena. Rather, 
it is the radical dispensing with them using 
different kinds of phenomenological reduction. 
This having been said, it is a somewhat useless 
task to analyze whether there are really any 
‘striking parallels’ between the transcendental 
                                                          
1 “Is it reasonable to regard what is non-eternal, 
painful, and subject to change as: ‘This is mine. 
This is my Self.  This is what I am’?” – “There is 
no reason, lord.” (BJT, p. 204, at 
ftp://scorpio.gold.ac.uk/jbe/Pali) 
 
phenomenology of Husserl and the Lusthaus' 
interpretation of Yogacara.  For a traditional 
phenomenologist, it is clear that the phenomena 
of Lusthaus are not the phenomena of Husserl. 
Calling his book Buddhist Phenomenology with 
the explicit promise that readers will find some 
worthy applications of the phenomenological 
method of Husserl to the study of Yogacara, is an 
empty intention. What has been promised on 
page 4 is quickly denied on page 5. 
Explaining what Yogacara is not, Lusthaus 
postulates three forms of idealism: 
• Metaphysical idealism. 
• Epistemological idealism (which seems 
to be the subjective idealism, where the 
subject is grasped as non-reducible 
entity). 
• Critical epistemological idealism. 
These three idealistic paradigms are “thoroughly 
inappropriate for Yogacara” because Yogacara 
performs a total deconstruction of the illusion of 
subjectivity (self-hood). But, in its first stage, 
Yogacara follows a “similar trajectory to that 
typically found in epistemological idealism.” 
Kant, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty listed as equal 
representatives of the “epistemological idealism” 
are ‘appropriate’ for the Yogacara because they 
each hold that we should enquire about reality 
from the viewpoint of consciousness, but 
“thoroughly inappropriate” as long as they start 
to treat consciousness as “ultimately real 
(paramartha-sat), much less the only reality.” 
Yes, this is the exact phrase; Kant and Husserl 
are dismissed by Lusthaus because they allegedly 
regard consciousness as real and declare it to be 
the only reality.  If this chapter of the book were 
software, such allegations would have presented 
a major security hole for phenomenological and 
other “critical-epistemological” hackers to 
exploit and ruin the Lusthaus programme. 
Neither do Kant and Husserl define 
consciousness as the only reality, nor does 
Yogacara deny explicitly the paramarthasatta of 
such notions as akasa and the two nirodhas, let 
alone tathata, dharmata, or bhutarthata. 
Yogacara, says the author, displays a consistent 
methodology, and it is this methodology that is 
charcterized as ‘phenomenology’ (p. 9). We have 
seen that the “epistemological idealism” has been 
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assessed as a kind of discardable methodological 
prolegomena to the proper methodology of 
Yogacara seen in the perspective of a total 
deconstruction of the Transcendental Self. Yet, 
the title of the book misleadingly suggests 
classical phenomenology, and there are numerous 
equally misleading statements to the effect that it 
is the “Husserlian sense of phenomenology ... 
that the present work follows” (p. 11). It is true 
that Husserl defined his phenomenological 
project as transcendental idealism, but the 
difference between his own and Kant's 
transcendental idealism marks the fundamental 
distinction between phenomenalism and 
phenomenologism. Kant's philosophy and 
Buddhist philosophy are phenomenalist to the 
extent that both recognize the facticity of the 
sense-data called phenomena (dharma).  It is 
only in this meaning that HH Dalai Lama speaks 
of Buddhist phenomenology. The difference 
between Kant and Buddhist philosophy, 
according to Lusthaus, is that the Buddhist 
philosophy of Yogacara takes all phenomena as 
mental fabrications, not as appearances of the 
things in themselves – which are far from being 
mental constructions. Transcendental idealism is 
outlined as “a critical concern with 
epistemological issues, which is a recognition 
that knowledge comes through cognition, but 
without implying any metaphysical statement 
about the nature of reality as dependent on or 
created by mind” (ibid.). 
This, however, is not a sufficient reason to 
declare the philosophy of Yogacara 
phenomenological in the Husserlian sense of the 
word. References to Maurice Merleau-Ponty with 
his phenomenology of a body-only doctrine are 
not helpful in explaining the Asanga-Vasubandhu 
mind-only philosophy, despite all post-
explanations to the effect that vijnaptimatrata 
does not mean metaphysical or epistemological 
idealism. The fact is that vijnaptimatrata does not 
assign any special constitutive role to the rupa 
(body) and samjna (perception), as is the case 
with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. If we 
say that what makes Yogacara phenomenological 
is the insistence on the “cognitive roots of 
knowledge,” then all early 20th century positivists 
and analytical philosophers should have also 
been listed among the phenomenological 
philosophers. The “philosophical alienation” is 
still there between logical positivism and 
transcendental phenomenology, despite their 
common anti-metaphysical stance. 
Is the Yogacara philosophy really developing a 
project similar to that of Husserl? To name 
Yogacara phenomenological, one has to find and 
prove the existence in Yogacara of: 
1. Phenomenological reduction 
2. Phenomenological psychology 
3. Eidetic reduction 
4. Wesenschau 
5. Transcendental Subject 
6. Transcendental constitution 
7. Intersubjective monadology (optionally) 
Only then will the philosophical reader be 
convinced that we have a proto-
phenomenological project in the philosophy of 
Yogacara, and that Yogacara is the Buddhist 
Phenomenology. 
Judging from what is contained in Chapter Two, 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, none of the above 
criteria is discussed or even touched upon. 
Instead, we find a ‘revolutionary’ definition of 
the transcendental idealism: 
This idealism was ‘transcendental’ in the 
sense that its objects of investigation were 
the transcendental conditions of 
experience – ‘transcendental’ here 
meaning nothing more than what 
constitutes without giving itself as an 
object in that experience. For instance, the 
eye is transcendental to seeing ... (ibid.) 
 
The legitimate objects of the transcendental 
phenomenology are the eidetic phenomena, the 
pure morphological entities (Wesenheiten) as 
Husserl calls them. If they were invisible to the 
Transcendental Subject, they would not have 
been called eidetic. Phenomena as the 
constitutive Wesenheiten of transcendental 
phenomenology are all visible because they are 
selbstzeigende Washeiten (self-manifesting 
quidditas). Something selsbtzeigendes is, by all 
means, transparent to the subject of cognition. 
There is no place here for the analytical-positivist 
notion of phenomenological transparency. The 
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eye as a physical sense organ of vision is as much 
a transcendent object of reduction as any external 
transcendent object bracketed during the first 
stage of the phenomenological reduction.  The 
fact of being bodily or psychologically immanent 
is not a mark of the cognitive transcendentalism. 
Besides, transcendent and transcendental are two 
different categories, and, what is more, Husserl is 
distinguishing between two types of 
transcendence - the trancendence of the external 
object and the transcendence of the immanent 
fact when the latter is not entirely and not 
properly given to our consciousness. It is a kind 
of viparita-jnana, and this ‘state of being a 
perverted knowledge’ (viparitajnanatva) turns 
the psycho-cognitive fact into something 
transcendent. 
Second, transcendental constitution does not 
proceed through the physical eye, much in the 
same way that what is seen in the samadhi-
prajna (the wisdom of meditation) is not 
constituted by the action of caksu (eye) for the 
simple reason that all physiological and noetic 
activity of the visual sense organ has been 
previously cancelled in the process of the 
phenomenological tapas (reduction, askesis). To 
quote from another authority in Yoga, samapatti 
(which is the Indian analog to the 
phenomenological Wesenschau) follows upon 
cancelling all citta-vrtti (operational modes of 
consciousness) based on the functioning of the 
bahindriya (external sense organs), see, Yoga-
sutra I.41. Or, as Nagarjuna has put it in his 
rarely translated mangala-vada to 
Mulamadhyamaka-karika, the perfectly 
Awakened has pacified the phenomenal world 
(prapancopasama). (See Bauddha-bharati-
granthamala 16) 
Leaving the five senses to operate as 
‘transcendental factors’ amounts to a continuous 
production of prapancita-vikalpas (phenomenal 
constructions), while the ultimate goal of Yoga 
(Yogacara means a Yogic behaviour) is to put an 
end to the world-variegating activities of 
consciousness and to start seeing the phenomena 
as such (tatha), which brings the samadhin to the 
state of the truth-abounding Dharma Cloud. 
Husserl used to radically oppose any 
interpretation of his transcendental 
phenomenolgy in terms of Plato's objective 
idealism. It is precisely this kind of Platonic 
understanding of Husserlian transcendental 
phenomenology that we find explicitly declared 
in Dan Lusthaus' work: 
By ‘idealism’ Husserl meant the region 
of ideas, thoughts, feelings, etc., in 
other words, the total spectrum of 
conscious experience as it is constituted 
and present to us. (ibid.) 
 
The region of the “ideas, thoughts, feelings, 
etc.,”, as any other ontological region, has two 
basic component parts - Dasein and Sosein. 
Husserl's transcendental idealism consists of 
suspending the Dasein elements of any Sein, both 
transcendent and immanent, and in analyzing the 
remaining Sosein elements. It is very difficult for 
a Yogacarin to grasp this, because instead of 
suspending the Dasein constituents of being, a 
Buddhist epistemologist would quite naturally 
suppose the non-existence of such constituents, 
their emptiness, thus succumbing to an 
unreflected metaphysical presuppositionalism. 
The next move of the modern Buddhist 
epistemologist is to declare the Dasein 
constituents, already explained away, as identical 
to the transcendental subjectivity, thus falling 
pray to a kind of unfair-play sunyavada 
(nihilistic) extremism. 
Proving himself a master of the free play with 
terms devoid of their proper phenomenological 
meaning, an attitude so characteristic of the 
postmodern intellectuals, Lusthaus states that 
“the reader will discover phenomenological and 
deconstructive terminology liberally spread 
throughout this work” (p. 12). I find myself 
agreeing with him regarding the “liberal spread” 
but herein lies a problem. The “spread” is so 
liberal in fact, that the terms used have nothing to 
do with their original Husserlian semantics, and 
express rather the opposite of what Husserl 
meant and said! The warning that using 
phenomenological terminology should not be 
taken as evidence that concepts of the one system 
can be reproduced in terms of the other, does not 
help very much as the concepts behind the terms 
do not correspond to the original concepts 
implied by the use of phenomenological 
terminology. With the same success, if not 
greater, the author could have used the 
terminological apparatus of the quantum-
mechanical phenomenology (QMP) to express 
his concepts (in fact, vikalpas) about Yogacara. 
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Lusthaus may not be informed about the proper 
meaning of the phenomenological terms used by 
Husserl, but he is competent enough to say that 
Husserl's “virtual neurosis for rewriting and re-
editing made it a marvel that he managed to 
publish at all” (ibid.). Having failed to point out 
the specific nature of Husserl's phenomenology 
against the ‘phenomenology’ of Kant and 
wrongly taken it to be a description of the 
Platonic framework, Lusthaus is aware so 
perfectly well of the various changing 
characteristics of the prajnaptic mindstream 
called ‘Husserl’ that he can “recite these 
characteristics and their alternation” (ibid.). The 
claim that “Husserl is not self-identical with 
himself” (p. 13) does not release the 
phenomenological researcher from the burden of 
showing the specific identity of Husserl as a 
thinker, and to stick to this identity. Lusthaus 
denies that there is a standing conceptual identity 
in the phenomenology of Husserl. This makes all 
his further “phenomenological” studies highly 
irrelevant. Failing to recognize the identity of 
Husserlian phenomenology as a heuristic method 
– it is not the method of Husserl but rather 
Husserl himself that is identified as a “heuristic 
concatenation” (p. 12) – Lusthaus claims that 
“Yogacara is a form of phenomenology, with 
affinities to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc., if not 
identities” (p. 13). Husserl is not identical to 
himself, while Yogacara reveals some identities 
with him.2 
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